Showing posts with label metanarratives. Show all posts
Showing posts with label metanarratives. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Oblique joke

From here, but in general circulation.
A helicopter was flying around above Seattle yesterday when an electrical malfunction disabled all of the aircraft's electronic navigation and communications equipment. Due to the clouds and haze, the pilot could not determine the helicopter's position and course to steer to the airport.

The pilot saw a tall building, flew toward it, circled, drew a handwritten sign, and held it in the helicopter's window. The pilot's sign said ''WHERE AM I?'' in large letters.

People in the tall building quickly responded to the aircraft, drew a large sign, and held it in a building window. Their sign said ''YOU ARE IN A HELICOPTER.''

The pilot smiled, waved, looked at his map, determined the course to steer to SEATAC airport, and landed safely.

After they were on the ground, the co-pilot asked the pilot how the ''YOU ARE IN A HELICOPTER'' sign helped determine their position.

The pilot responded ''I knew that had to be the MICROSOFT building because, similar to their help-lines, they gave me a technically correct but completely useless answer.''
The reason for quoting this relates to the evolution/creation/ID debate. Biologically, we are naked apes. Our genetic material is startlingly similar to that of chimpanzees. This message has been drummed into us for at least the last forty years or more. And animals themselves are no more than devices which have developed to ensure the survival of genes.

This may be a very accurate description of what we are. But it is almost completely useless. It tells us little even about love, birth, death and families, and nothing of any use about music, art, cornflakes, the Eiffel Tower, nuclear weapons, Sartre, town planning, Doctor Who, Nectar points or philosophy. And if the light it casts on such matters is so dim, then its value as part of a metanarrative must be considered limited.

Monday, December 24, 2007

Dawkins' selfish genes

An interesting concept. The idea that Dawkins wishes to convey, I think, is that in actual fact, all the human-scale phenomena that we notice - our behaviour, our thoughts, our rationalisations and so on - are actually the outcome of the way our genes behave. And they are "selfish" in the sense that what a successful gene will do is ensure its propagation in increased number.

But we rapidly come up against problems in the way in which we use language. "Selfish" is an expressive word - but it is fundamentally misleading. We have an image of what "selfishness" means - it means grabbing resources for oneself to the exclusion of other people. Well, that's what a gene which will increase in abundance will do. But the word "selfish" is an anthropomorphism - and Dawkins is trying to tell us that such human behaviours don't really exist, but are the outcome of the behaviour of our genes. In any case, our genes aren't conscious entities - they don't choose to behave in a way that grabs resources; it is simply the case that a gene will only propagate into the next generation if it does something that encourages its survival.

There are other issues with this, of course - it is misleading to think that one gene in a complex organism has a direct influence on its abundance in the next generation.

So despite the power of the image, selfishness is one of the darwinists' famous "invisible pink unicorns" - a mythical creature that, even if it existed, would be invisible.

Monday, July 02, 2007

"Edge of Evolution" - theology of mechanism

A commenter writes:
ID is what is not testable, because no mechanism or characteristic outcome is proposed (aside from "it looks complex sometimes, other times it's simple, whatever the designer decides").
Interestingly, Behe goes into more detail in his book on this issue. As I've said already, Behe accepts both common descent and natural selection. What he takes issue with is whether random mutation, as a key part of darwinism, is up to the job of explaining the complexity of life.

What's the alternative? He points out that if there is a "designer" who is able to fine tune the cosmos in such a way as to make it fit for habitation, there's no inherent reason that it shouldn't be possible for this designer also to arrange events - either at the time the universe appears or at a later stage - to bring about other goals that he wishes.

This line of argument reminded me of Schaeffer's argument that propositional revelation is not nonsense. I'm not sure it actually leads any further than deism - but then, I would suggest that Romans 1 argues that this is pretty much as far as general revelation would take you anyway, which is fair enough. Behe argues that further discussion about the nature of the designer is a matter for philosophy and theology - again, I'm pretty happy with that.

"So," the opponent of ID then answers, "ID is unfalsifiable. Behe is saying that the events that make up the evolutionary history of life could be interpreted as 'natural' - the inevitable outcome of the starting circumstances. If it is natural, how does that differ from a naturalistic explanation? Surely all you are doing is invoking some external agency, which is an unnecessary philosophical/theological step."

To which my answer would be: Riiiiiiiiiight. So I toss a coin and it comes up heads, That's luck. I do it again. Heads - luck again. I do it a hundred times, all heads. Luck. I shuffle a pack of cards and deal them - all the spades in order, then all the hearts in order, then all the diamonds in order, then all the clubs in order. Luck. I press keys at random on a computer, and come up with the complete works of Shakespeare. Luck.

What Behe is saying is, yes, you could possibly contrive a series of circumstances in which events happen in such a way that we end up where we are today. But to describe this as the outcome of "random" mutations, and the design of the universe as being "lucky" would be disingenuous. If things are that specific - tailored that carefully to produce life - then darwinism is certainly not the right picture, because this is not a "random" outcome - it is highly non-random, just as the circumstances that led to the moon being the size it is must have been highly specific, and the fine tuning of fundamental constants is also highly non-random. As has been pointed out before, once a sufficiently low level of probability is reached (Ford and Arthur turning into penguins?), we basically say, "Impossible." I don't believe that it is reasonable to say that something is so improbable that it is (to all accounts and purposes) impossible, but then shrug and say, "Well, it happened. We're here, aren't we?"

Let's put it another way. Suppose the world in which we find ourselves does turn out to be an incredibly low-probability outcome. In these circumstances, what would falsify the darwinian view of the world? If you can say that, no matter how improbable the outcome, it was just random mutations getting lucky, then under what circumstances can you say that darwinism isn't true? If there are none, then darwinism is every bit as unfalsifiable as it is claimed ID is by its opponents.

Behe also looks at the multiverse idea - does this have more explanatory power? He argues not - and specifically, if you have an infinite number of universes, he argues, then you have explained nothing at all, since in an infinite number of those infinite number, the entire universe will in fact be a trick of our consciousness, rather than something that really exists.

I have my reservations about Behe's thoughts here - that everything might be regarded as a "natural" outcome. My hunch - though I don't have the science to back it - is that if Christianity is true, there has been "supernatural" input at various stages - perhaps corresponding with the six biblical days of creation. However, this is theology, not science ....

Thursday, June 14, 2007

The science of astrology

Michael Behe believes that astrology ought to be taught in classrooms. Actually, he doesn't. I wrote about this some time ago. However, it still suits various people, including commenters here, to believe that he does.

If you want to know more about the scientific status of astrology, today's "In Our Time" on Radio 4 was about astrology. Whilst it may surprise many people, the experts on the programme insisted that until around AD 1500, astrology had a similar scientific standing to other sciences, like medicine. And there was a rationale which underlay this view, as well.

Which was pretty much as Michael Behe said in the Dover Trial.

The experts all three also suggested, in opposition to Melvyn Bragg, the presenter, that there wasn't a sudden disappearance of the influence of astrology, even as late as Newton, and reformation was thought to be the way forward, rather than wholesale rejection.

Thursday, June 07, 2007

Another round with empiricism

I think the heart of the empiricist objection to belief in God is that they are unable to observe anything supernatural.

But does the fact that a person is unable to observe something have any bearing on whether or not it exists? And if not, is empiricism any use at all as a metanarrative to provide guidance as to what is true and what isn't?

A blind person is unable to see things - by definition - although obviously he or she can observe things by using other senses. But does the fact that somebody is unable to see mean that he or she would be right to conclude that there is no such thing as vision?

A scientist living in the pre-modern era might have no means of detecting radio waves. Does that mean that radio waves didn't exist in the pre-modern era? (No - they are generated naturally, as are all sorts of electromagnetic waves). Does it mean that he would have been right to say that there was no such thing, as an empirical worldview might have led him to?

People who have an empiricist worldview can argue this in one of two ways. They could firstly say that from the perspective of the blind person, or the scientist, they would be right. If so, empirical truth becomes relative - something which I'm sure my commenters would thunder against! Or they can say that those people would be wrong. The fact that the blind person can't see doesn't mean that there is no such thing as vision. The fact that the pre-modern scientist can't conceive of radio waves doesn't mean that they don't exist.

What about God, or the supernatural. Does the fact that God can't be observed have any bearing on whether or not he exists?

NO!!!!!!!! Of course it doesn't. There are all sorts of reasons why God might not choose to be observed, why the universe might appear not to contain anything supernatural to a sceptical observer, why a reasonably plausible case might be made for the natural origin and evolution of the universe. But this has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether or not there actually is a God.

Another question. What is the impact of an empiricist worldview on the pursuit of knowledge, compared to (say) a theistic one? The theist will continue to observe the universe, eyes and imagination wide open, looking for new things. The empiricist will work towards simply closing the gaps in knowledge, and not expect the unexpected.

I'm sure that this will provoke some response ...

Tuesday, June 05, 2007

"Why isn't evidence sufficient when it works?"

My anti-empiricism isn't fundamentally because the scientific method doesn't work. It's because it doesn't represent a sufficiently solid epistemological foundation. Let me try and explain.

Descartes, when he famously said, "Cogito ergo sum," was trying to derive a philosophical foundation from which it was possible to derive everything else in the universe - he was concerned about epistemology (how we can know). The statement is a good start, but unfortunately, you can't get past that foundation. You can't know that the rest of the universe is anything other than some aspect of your own consciousness.

The empiricist approach is to put this issue to one side, and say, "Well, the universe seems to behave itself - it seems to behave as though there is something really there, that acts in a tractable and reproducible way - I can do experiments on it, I can make observations in ways that I hadn't previously imagined, and it all hangs together properly."

The problem with this is, how can I know that this isn't simply my own consciousness constructing a world around me? How can I know that I am not a part of some Matrix-like construction? How can I know that, in fact, there isn't a god, and I am seeing exactly what he/she/it wants me to see? And the answer to all of those questions is, you can't. You start from your own consciousness, and make a leap of faith to conclude that there is a real universe beyond you. You then make another leap of faith to conclude that the real universe is all that there is - and in many ways, this is the oddest one. Given that you had to make a leap of faith to conclude that there was a universe at all, how can you then have any confidence that there is nothing more than the universe?

So what's the alternative? What do I believe that isn't empiricism?

Start instead from the proposition that there is an external absolute, a prime mover (if you like). Yes, this is a faith position, but so is the belief that there is a universe there at all, and nothing else. Both are presuppositions. Both are foundations for knowledge upon which the rest of our understanding of the universe is built.

Francis Schaeffer, in an essay entitled "Is Propositional Revelation Nonsense?" makes the case for the reasonableness of this position, and I could do no better than he has already. In addition to which, I need to go to work now ....

Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Gonzalez and the need for critical thinking

What is truth? Is truth the same as received opinions? Is there no such thing as truth? Or is there a definite version of events that is more representative of reality than any other?

I would argue for the latter, and I guess most of the people who read this and comment here would agree - even if they have a different opinion as to what that truth is. If this is the case, they believe that it is meaningful to seek to persuade me of the rightness of their idea of what truth is, just as when I write this, I am seeking to an extent to persuade readers of the rightness of my ideas.

This ties in with the headline, by the way - "Data isn't information; information isn't knowledge; knowledge isn't wisdom; wisdom isn't truth." In that, I am seeking to draw attention to the fact that truth is ultimately something "external" - something "beyond" the observer - even the most reliable of observers can go no further than his or her observations allow. You can infer from the headline that this blog expresses a view which is at its core anti-empiricist!

Of course, people will have different perceptions of how things are - the same event observed by different observers will result in their drawing different conclusions. This is a point I have already made regarding science - that the difference between proponents of ID and proponents of naturalism isn't fundamentally one of science (both can do the same experiments, and make the same observations) but one of presuppositions/worldviews/metanarratives. If you exclude the idea of external agency, then you are bound to interpret your observations in this light. Hence Dawkins' famous comment to the effect that if he saw a statue of the virgin Mary move, he would be more likely to believe in a vastly improbable quantum phenomenon than in a miracle of divine origin. And vice versa. Scientific experiments are almost certainly not going to have an impact on people's presuppositions - this is a part that scientific experiments simply don't reach.

However, people on both sides of the ID/naturalism debate accept in principle that there is the possibility of a definitive answer. Both Dawkins and (say) Dembski would be prepared to say that something happened to the statue (contrast "There is no spoon" - The Matrix) - a measurable change has occurred, and further that this requires some sort of explanation - that events are contingent.

For most people, "truth" is something that they apprehend from all sorts of sources, and few these days are prepared to engage sufficient critical faculties to come to a sensible conclusion as to what real truth is. For the few who are prepared to engage critical thinking skills, it is easy to underestimate the power and perceived authority of these sources of information - which include web references and search engines. "You can't possibly believe the nonsense being put out by such-and-such a group," we often think to ourselves. Oh yes they can! Somebody, somewhere, must be making it worthwhile to spammers putting out those silly emails promising to pay a million pounds into your bank account if you will just send the details.

I didn't post about Gonzalez below because I thought I was adding to the debate in any way. Neither was it because I thought that Discovery Institute is somehow authoritative in a way that (say) Panda's Thumb isn't. The reason for the post was to make more visible an alternative perspective - so that hopefully people searching the internet for information will not only look up the anti-ID writings of bloggers and then assume that this is reliable.

"Oh, that wouldn't happen!" Don't you believe it. Urban myths gain currency rapidly. Was the cabin boy in Captain Pugwash called Roger? No. Are the park keepers at the Grand Canyon really being told not to talk about the age of the Grand Canyon? No. Does the fact that this is so stop the stories going round and round, as somebody finds a reference to the incorrect facts on the internet and repeats it? No.

This isn't confined to the internet. "Inherit the Wind" was written as an anti-McCarthyite film, but the story of the film was the Scopes trial. The film is factually inaccurate - but people still assume that when they see it, they are seeing a historically reliable presentation. And the same could be said on a non-ID related theme of "JFK", the Oliver Stone film. Or the supposed historical references in "The Da Vinci Code". Or the Gnostic Gospels. Or Brecht's "Life of Galileo". Or Shakespeare's Histories.

By posting below - and even by posting this - I am not assuming that people will take what I have written as being reliable or true. I don't expect anybody to take anything they read as reliable or true. What I want to do is make sure that when people read things, they engage critical thinking skills, and don't just accept things because they fit with their presuppositions.

Friday, April 20, 2007

True rationality but not only rationality

A discussion is raging (well, simmering) on my previous post, regarding whether you need more than empiricism to do science (or conversely, whether anything more than empiricism actually undermines science). In that context, I thought I'd post another short extract from Schaeffer:
Although rationality is important, it should never become exclusively so. ... The Christian is not rationalistic; he does not try to begin from himself autonomously and work out a system from there on [which was, of course, Descartes' method - EfG]. But he is rational: he thinks and acts on the basis that A is A and A is not non-A. However, he does not end with only rationality, for in his response to what God has said his whole personality is involved....

A number of years ago I was at a discussion group in Detroit. An older black pastor was there. We discussed many intellectual and cultural problems and the answers given by Christianity. One would have called the discussion "intellectual" rather than devotional. As he was leaving, the pastor shook my hand and thanked me. If he had said, "Thank you for helping me to defend my people better," or "Thank you for helping me to be a better evangelist," I would have been very glad that what I had said had been helpful, and then possibly I would not have given it another thought. But what he actually said was, "Thank you for opening these doors to me; now I can worship God better." I will never forget him because he was a man who really understood. If this is not our own response first of all, and then the response of those whom we try to help, we have made a mistake somewhere.

Francis Schaeffer, "The God Who is There"
The modernist, empirical approach, as far as I can see, gives no real foundation for anything other than rationality - and indeed, only offers as a foundation for rationality the fact that it works. This is incredibly distant from what we are as human beings. The awareness of this limitation was I suspect what caused Dawkins to write "Unweaving the Rainbow".

But no matter how you add, subtract, multiply and divide, the modernist worldview still can't allow us to be more than zeroes. The only way in which we can have the significance we instinctively invest in ourselves (and which even - perhaps especially! - Dawkins invests in himself) is if that significance is externally attributed.

Monday, April 16, 2007

Christian Science

No, not that sort ....

I've written before about the fact that science comes from a Reformation Christian worldview, and that the suggestion that science is equivalent to philosophical naturalism is historically and philosophically ignorant.

A post on Evolution News makes a similar point in more detail.

Thursday, March 15, 2007

More on Schaeffer...

... if you are interested, can be found on Mike Godfrey's blog - he has a series of posts on "He is There and He is Not Silent", which comes bundled in a trilogy with "The God who is There" and "Escape from Reason".

Included in this is part of the justification for Schaeffer's assertion that there are only a limited number of possible fundamental worldviews - regarding the origin of the universe, either:
- The universe has always existed; or
- The universe had an impersonal origin; or
- The universe had a personal origin.

Isn't this an exclusive set? And if it is, isn't it reasonable to think that these are in principle statements which may have scientific implications that could be tested?

Friday, March 02, 2007

The Power of the Urban Myth

(H/T Telic Thoughts ... again!)

The Guardian proposes a new understanding of the polarisation of opinion in the UK today - three ways, between religious fundamentalists, atheistic fundamentalists, and the "enlightened, tolerant" crowd. This is, in my opinion, a healthy article, as it recognises the danger of atheistic intolerance to religious freedom. It reports on the current tensions between Christian unions and student unions in a fairly liberal way - certainly much more so than one might have expected given the newspaper's left-wing credentials. The article argues for reasoned debate to be conducted in a public arena, and concludes:
What should such a public square be like? It might not be Menckian, but it could be based on respectful understanding of others' most cherished beliefs, argues Spencer: "We should be more willing to treat other value systems as coherent, reasonable and even valuable rather than as primitive or grotesque mutations of liberal humanism to which every sane person adheres." It is, at least, a hope, albeit one, given our current climate, in which it would be foolish to place too much faith.
- a sentiment which I have a lot of time for - see also here.

However, what leads me to post is the fact that it presented again a kind of darwinist "urban myth" - or an "icon of darwinism", if you like.
In 1860, one year after the publication of Darwin's On the Origin of Species, the Bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce, and TH Huxley, the naturalist described as "Darwin's bulldog", went toe-to-toe at Oxford's Natural History Museum. According to a contemporary report in McMillan's magazine, "The bishop turned to his antagonist with smiling insolence. He begged to know, was it through his grandfather or his grandmother that he claimed his descent from a monkey? Huxley rose to reply ... He [said he] was not ashamed to have a monkey for his ancestor; but he would be ashamed to be connected with a man who used great gifts to obscure the truth ... One lady fainted and had to be carried out."
No case is really made from this, other than to suggest that the church was feeling threatened at the time. So from that point of view, I suppose you could argue that it doesn't really matter. But that's not how it was. Here is a more thoroughly researched account. To quote from it:
One of the most distinguished of the Darwinians was Joseph Hooker, Assistant Director of Kew gardens. But to read his account of the proceedings is to meet the view that Huxley had caused hardly a stir. He had not even had the strength of voice for his stinging reply to carry. According to Hooker the person who really won the day for the Darwinians was ... Hooker! In fact, the more closely we look at the legend the more suspect it becomes. The idea that Huxley won a famous victory was not even countenanced in Leonard Huxley's heroic Life. The result of the encounter, though a check to the anti-Darwinian sceptics, could not be represented as an "immediate and complete triumph for evolutionary doctrine". This was precluded by the "character and temper of the audience, most of whom were less capable of being convinced by the arguments than shocked by the boldness of the retort." One of Huxley's most recent and empathetic biographers, Adrian Desmond, agrees that talk of a victor is ridiculous. The Athenaeum put it rather well: the Bishop and Huxley "have each found foemen worthy of their steel, and made their charges and countercharges very much to their own satisfaction and the delight of their respective friends."

There is an additional, perhaps surprising, reason why we should not speak of victors. Instead of anti-Darwinians being converted by either Huxley or Hooker, we know that at least one Darwinian was de-converted in the debate.
The thing is, the more times an urban myth is repeated, especially in reputable places like the UK broadsheet newspapers, the harder it is (these days) to establish the truth - reliable accounts are swamped in search engines by the unreliable ones, more books are written presuming the unreliable accounts to be true, and so on.

There is no shortage of similar accounts where the truth ends up obscured by spin, of course - and perhaps hardly anywhere more so than in the religion/science debate. The "Inherit the Wind" version of the Scopes trial - which was actually used as a metaphor for McCarthyism - is far better known than the actual version, despite the actual version being a matter of public record. Compare the Brecht version of the trial of Galileo with the Dava Sobel version - again, it is the "religion versus science" one which is better known, and less factual. People will go on suggesting that Michael Behe thought that astrology was scientific - when that wasn't the point he was trying to get across in the Dover trial. People will make more of the fact that Judge Jones is "religious" and "a Republican" than the legal opinion that he did not have authority to define what science is. People will go on suggesting that Sternberg was wrong to do what he did in printing Meyer's article on the Cambrian Explosion, when as I understand it, due process has concluded that he acted properly. No doubt people on "the other side" will be as keen to point out occasions when people "on my side" have been guilty of spinning the truth as well.

There is such a thing as truth - true truth, that isn't just a case of "one person's story against another's". Both sides in any debate need to do what they can to present facts as accurately and openly as possible. The short-term expedient of winning a few people over to a distorted version of the truth can't be allowed to drive debates - people have to be presented with the most accurate available information, and allowed to make up their minds based on this. There is a part of me which fears, with the explosion of spin and distorted versions of events, that we are improbably on the verge of a new Dark Age, simply because nobody will really know anything any more.

Tuesday, February 27, 2007

Scientific American interchange

The debate between non-theistic and theistic beliefs shows no sign of dying down. A couple of letters in this month's SciAm worthy of comment. Here's the first:
You are too generous to religion. Science disproves fundamental tenets of every major religious system, from creation stories to miracles to visions of the afterlife, and after throwing these out there is nothing left beyond a nebulous "religious feeling" and some moral principles, which are largely common sense to begin with.

If this counts as "religion", then perhaps it can coexist with science, but those who profess faith both in science and in one of the established religions make a mockery of both.

Will Nelson, Tucson AZ
This letter is sloppily worded. Science doesn't "disprove" miracles. Perhaps Nelson means that, under controlled conditions, miracles aren't observed to happen. But this doesn't prove that they haven't happened.

Perhaps, instead, he means that miracles are incompatible with philosophical naturalism - PN is unable to accommodate an event that is not explicable by naturalistic processes. But then it is not valid to simply equate philosophical naturalism with science - as has been pointed out many times, modern science was established by people who didn't have a philosophically naturalistic worldview, and yet this didn't invalidate their science. This line of argument would be more credible if a proof for the soundness of philosophical naturalism could be presented - but all we are really offered is a utilitarian, "It seems to work". Since there are other worldviews that are just as sound as philosophical naturalism which don't rule out the possibility of miracles, and within which science can just as well be carried out, the bald assertion that "science disproves ... miracles" is simply false.

If there were nothing left beyond "religious feelings" then I would be happy to agree with what Nelson says - but this has not been demonstrated. Incidentally, you would be right to conclude from this that I am not happy with faith being a kind of post-modern "upper-story" (see Schaeffer - here's a good place to start) phenomenon.

Nelson's use of the phrase "faith ... in science" is telling. It is a "worldviewish" term - one which suggests that Nelson is really talking about philosophical naturalism ("scientism") rather than the scientific method. Also, he sets "faith in science" and "faith in established religion" against each other - which highlights the fact that, if he thinks that belief in established religion is a fundamentally irrational act, then he thinks the same of belief in science.

Sunday, January 28, 2007

The Wedge Document; so what?

Allygally continues to try and make political capital here with reference to the "Wedge Document" - for example, he says:
To quote the "Wedge " document, the Discovery Instutute's battle plan, available here ...

"Design theory promises to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview, and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions."

The aim of IDers is not just to replace the dominant theory of evolution, the neo-Darwinist synthesis, which currently holds. It is to replace the whole modern and enlightened edifice of reason and logic and replace it with "Christian and theistic convictions", i.e. religion if you are a religious person, superstition if you know better.
He manages to sway the easily impressionable:
I confess that I hadn't read the Wedge document. Thanks for that tip, I'm just looking at it now.

Bloody Hell...are these guys for real? Obviously I have a lot of catching up to do.
I have not taken much notice until now, because I don't think it's terribly sinister - I agree with much of the agenda it sets out - I think that materialism is culturally destructive, and needs to be responded to. I do that as I tell people the gospel, and also in reflecting what I consider to be a more positive and holistic perspective in my writing.

But just for the sake of anyone who might think this is a great creationist conspiracy, I think it would be sensible to point out that you don't have to dig out the text of the Wedge document in obscure places where copies have been hidden safely out of reach of the grasping claws of the coming theocracy - you can get it direct from the Discovery Institute itself. Here's a link. Not only do they include the text of the document, but for good measure, they also explain why it was written, what it means, and they point out that far from being a secret conspiracy, their programme for challenging materialism and its legacies is public. I would draw your attention to the section starting half way down page 3.

Wednesday, January 24, 2007

Evidence for Intelligent Design

A challenge to proponents of Intelligent Design is that there is no scientific evidence for what they believe, and they believe it on what are fundamentally religious or presuppositional grounds.

Well, beliefs are of course consistent with people's metanarratives - most people who have some concept of logic (which rules out a whole crowd of postmodernists) believe things that are consistent with their metanarrative. If they don't, they have to change the metanarrative to fit - a painful process, but necessary if people are going to hang together mentally.

The next question then, is whether my beliefs are consistent with external evidence. Again, I am bound to say that I think this is so. It is normal for people's presuppositions to affect their interpretation of evidence. Part of what underlay the work of Dembski and Behe - which started prior to the supposed "politicization" of ID - was a formal attempt to get people to say under what circumstances design could be reasonably inferred. This was an agenda that was in principle accepted by Darwin, for example, in his statement that if something could be shown not to have arisen by step-by-step processes, his theory would be falsified. But in many cases, if Dembski's and Behe's work in this regard is accepted, it is then ruled outside the scope of science. So these projects having failed to win acceptance, we are left with everybody making observations and interpreting them in accordance with their presuppositions.

Take the plausibility scale in the post below, of evolutionary events of seven different levels. (Or six, if you exclude abiogenesis, which would still need a naturalistic explanation, of course. Had to get that in, didn't I, Allygally?!) The darwinist looks at the fossil evidence, homologies and so on and says - "Belief that darwinism can cover all seven [or six] steps is reasonable. (It has to be, because there is no alternative.)" The proponent of ID looks at the same evidence, and says, "I can accept that evolution is a reasonable explanation of [say] steps 1, 2 and 3, but since I believe in the possibility of external agency as an alternative explanation, I don't accept - and don't have to accept - that it is a reasonable explanation of 4, 5, and 6." Same evidence, different conclusions. The "evidence for Intelligent Design" is the same as the "evidence for darwinism" - but interpreted according to a different set of presuppositions.

Which interpretation is right? Of course, from where I sit, I will tend to think that my interpretation is right - otherwise, I'd be busily revising my metanarrative. And don't think I can't - I used to be a Young Earth Creationist - a metanarrative which is built around a particular way of interpreting the first chapters of Genesis - but I have shifted. Darwinists will believe that their interpretation is right. Is there any way of moving the debate on?

Here's an example based on that plausibility scale, that shows how the debate might be moved on. Can you present scientific evidence that belief in the descent of whales and bats from a common ancestor is better explained by darwinism than it is by non-darwinian means without first presupposing the absence of a designer? In other words, do you have a naturalistic mechanism that reliably explains this? I would argue not. There is evidence, which is interpreted in a particular way by darwinists and in a different way by non-darwinists. What darwinists have is a naturalistic mechanism that is completely untried on this scale, which they assume must be true because they have already decided that the alternative can't be true. Unless a better means for testing the evidence is available, the debate stalls at this point.

Tuesday, January 23, 2007

What are proponents of Intelligent Design playing at?

Are they just "rubbishing the theory of evolution"?

No. They are happy to say that it is a theory that has been very successful at explaning a range of phenomena at the "micro-evolutionary" level. However, they wish to make clear that it has yet to be established as true at a "macro-evolutionary" level - as an explanation of the origin of life, complexity and intelligence. You can't just add an order of magnitude of time to a speciation event to get flight, or sight.

This is important, because the darwinist explanation of origins has philosophical implications, whether the darwinist acknowledges them - or is aware of them! - or not. If we are the product of time and chance, then cosmically speaking, nothing really matters - we are zeroes, at best like Arthur Dent with tendrils of guilt flapping meaninglessly and pointlessly around in an indifferent universe.

Now if this really seemed to be the case - if it looked as though time plus chance, random mutation plus natural selection, were an adequate explanation, then we could shrug and say, "Deal with it" (as Douglas Adams did to Arthur Dent and Trillian when all that they considered important was destroyed). But the fact is that life doesn't seem to be like that. The universe doesn't seem to be a "chance" place - we seem to have some an unusual place in the universe that is more than anthropically significant - accepted by non-ID people (Ward and Brownlee) as well as ID people (Gonzalez and Richards). Life doesn't seem to be the product of time and chance, at least for those people who haven't already presupposed this, and have to fit the evidence into their presuppositions - again, the fact that despite their public denial of anything other than consensus, the basis of large-scale evolutionary mechanisms are still a matter for debate (for example, between Dawkinsian gradualists and Gouldian punctuated equilibrians) underlines this point.

Perhaps this significance is illusory. Perhaps we are just like Adams' puddle, slowly drying in the sun. Perhaps the darwinian explanation will win through, and be backed up by science in the fullness of time. But at the moment, I (and proponents of ID) simply don't think it is the best explanation, and that the case for external intelligent agency isn't getting weaker, but stronger. I think people accept darwinism fundamentally because it fits with their presuppositions, not because of the strength of the evidence. In fact, by virtue of an ongoing debate, darwinism is intellectually stronger now than it was 25 years ago, when it was a lot more "the only game in town" from a scientific point of view. It's just that the case against darwinism has also strengthened.

So proponents of ID are trying to point out that the hard sell of darwinism isn't fundamentally about science - it's about presuppositions - philosophical and religious. Opponents of ID are just as much "religiously motivated" as its proponents. ID may be religion/philosophy - but for most scientists, darwinism has exactly the same status.

Tuesday, January 09, 2007

Debunking myths

Sam Harris, an American author of some renown, rather in the Dawkins mould, writes in the L.A. Times concerning ten myths about atheism that he feels need debunking.

The debunking has to wait, however, since his article fails to do this. Joy, at Telic Thoughts, draws attention to his lack of logic here and here.

Monday, December 11, 2006

"Naturalism works!"

It's possible to start tightening up a screw when it's not on its thread properly. And to start with, it all seems to be okay. It gets nice and tight, and it seems to hold properly. But you're wrecking the thread, and weakening the join. It wouldn't make the seal watertight, no matter how much you tightened it - if you were fixing a radiator on, or something.

How do you deal with this? The only way is to undo it and start again, and hope that you haven't already wrecked the thread.

What happens with naturalism, I think, is that the believer tightens the screw up when they haven't aligned it with the thread properly. It only seems to work. I don't think they end up with a watertight join.

Where naturalism breaks down is:
a) in epistemology - whilst it seems to the believer to work, you can't really know that there is anything else in the universe other than your consciousness. Descartes' famous "Cogito ergo sum" allows the observer to infer their own existence. However, it immediately means that the observer is unable to draw safe conclusions about anything else in the universe - everything else in the universe may simply be a product of the imagination of the observer, if you start from the observer.
b) in evidence (which is where ID comes in) - I think that the evidence, inferred through the scientific method, presented by ID proponents shows that naturalism is insufficient to the task required of it - which is to present a consistent metanarrative - a consistent explanation of everything.

A worldview is bound to seem pretty solid, and philosophical naturalism does work, in large measure. But it doesn't work well enough.

Monday, November 27, 2006

Christian philosophy

The Constructive Curmudgeon, Douglas Groothuis, writes a eulogy for Dr. Robert T. Herbert, who died recently.
Professor Herbert and I disagreed on many things. In a Philosophy of Religion seminar he was leading, I voiced concerns about a paper in which he argued that believers come down with faith as one comes down with a cold. That is, the faith is neither rational nor irrational. (The paper was subsequently published in Faith and Philosophy.) He asked me to write a response to his paper. I agreed with some hesitation. (Whether I really had a choice, I do not know.) When I received the paper back, it was filled with red ink comments challenging nearly every one of my criticisms. At the bottom of the last page was the grade: A+.
I have been involved in an email discussion recently relating, in effect, to epistemology - that is, the foundation of knowledge, both for Christians and non-Christians. This pointed me in the direction of Cornelius van Til. If you follow this link, you will find his "Credo", at the Center for Reformed Theology and Apologetics. I was surprised at how closely it fit with my own (less organised!) philosophical thoughts - and I was both gratified and a little disturbed to find this perspective described as "calvinist" - a label I had always shied away from for various reasons.