'A New Theory of Biology' was the title of the paper which Mustapha Mond had just finished reading. He sat for some time, meditatively frowning, then picked up his pen and wrote across the title-page. 'The author's mathematical treatment of the conception of purpose is novel and highly ingenious, but heretical and, so far as the present social order is concerned, dangerous and potentially subversive. Not to be published.' He underlined the words. 'The author will be kept under supervision. His transference to the Marine Biological Station of St Helena may become necessary.' A pity, he thought, as he signed his name. It was a masterly piece of work. But once you began admitting explanations in terms of purpose - well, you didn't know what the result might be. It was the sort of idea that might easily decondition the more unsettled minds among the higher castes - make them lose their faith in happiness as the Sovereign Good and take to believing, instead, that the goal was somewhere beyond, somewhere outside the present human sphere; that the purpose of life was not the maintenance of well-being, but some intensification and refining of consciousness, some enlargement of knowledge. Which was, the Controller reflected, quite possibly true. But not, in the present circumstances, admissible. He picked up his pen, and under the words 'Not to be published' drew a second line, thicker and blacker than the first; then sighed. 'What fun it would be,' he thought,' if one didn't have to think about happiness!'I hadn't read this book until now. We read "Nineteen Eighty-Four" in school in 1983 - but not this one. I wonder if the reason that it didn't make reading lists was because it was just too subversive - too undermining of the prevailing culture....
Brave New World, Aldous Huxley
Data is not information. Information is not knowledge. Knowledge is not wisdom. Wisdom is not truth. Truth is not life.
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Sunday, May 17, 2009
"Now stop worrying and enjoy your life."
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
The problem of miracles ...
... is one that is entirely a consequence of presuppositions.
Let's define a miracle first of all as an event which lies outside the bounds of normal cause and effect. This isn't something which is just a little improbable - somebody with cancer going into remission, for example, or somebody winning the lottery. It is something which is so improbable as to be considered impossible by any sensible person - for example, the sun standing still, or somebody who has been dead for three days coming back to life, or feeding 5000 and more people from a child's packed lunch. I think it was Arthur C. Clarke who pointed out that had the sun genuinely stopped moving in the sky, everybody on the planet would have slid across the surface for a thousand miles or so. In scientific terms, then, these miracles are preposterous.
Traditionally, alternative explanations are found, and the most hard-boiled miracles - the ones where it really becomes impossible to explain the narrative in terms of anything else - end up being discounted as myth. Why is that? Because such events lie outside our concept of how cause and effect work - we don't see how that can have been brought about. What has happened is that we have asserted, in effect, that all events must be confined to material cause and effect. Miracles don't happen, basically, because miracles don't happen.
Incidentally, a kind of reverse process happens for some aspects of myth. I remember in secondary school, some aspects of the account of Jason's travels in the Argo sound scientifically preposterous. But set against the background of the explosion of Santorini, all of a sudden some of the events become somewhat more explicable. That's another post, though ....
If you don't believe in God, or you believe in a God who is constrained to act in accordance with the laws of the universe, or you believe in a God who is detached from the universe, then it's inevitable that you will end up having to find an alternative explanation for miracles. But from a Christian point of view, there is no such problem. In Christian epistemological terms, the universe is God's universe. He created it; he has the ability to define the nature of reality. If he chooses to make the sun stand still over Gibeon - to suspend the laws of nature for some period of time, in one locality - then he can do that. The fact that there is no scientific way of explaining how it happened and no evidence for it is neither here nor there. That doesn't mean it didn't take place - simply that our scientific framework gives us no ability to determine how it took place.
Of course, this itself will rankle with people brought up on anything close to a materialistic worldview. "If we can't explain it, and there is no evidence for it, then how can we know it happened?" The thing is that materialism doesn't provide a worldview for explaining everything we see anyway. Aside from the fact that we can't really escape definitively from the solipsistic perspective that everything is in fact a dream, we then have to wrestle with the fact that materialism doesn't actually provide anything like a proper explanation of why there should be anything rather than nothing. In other words, rejecting accounts of miracles because they aren't consistent with a materialistic explanation of an event begs the issue that materialism fails to provide an adequate explanation of phenomena which are observed, and which we are unable to reject.
This is, I think, the heart of one of Berlinski's arguments against "atheism and its scientific pretentions" in "The Devil's Delusion".
Let's define a miracle first of all as an event which lies outside the bounds of normal cause and effect. This isn't something which is just a little improbable - somebody with cancer going into remission, for example, or somebody winning the lottery. It is something which is so improbable as to be considered impossible by any sensible person - for example, the sun standing still, or somebody who has been dead for three days coming back to life, or feeding 5000 and more people from a child's packed lunch. I think it was Arthur C. Clarke who pointed out that had the sun genuinely stopped moving in the sky, everybody on the planet would have slid across the surface for a thousand miles or so. In scientific terms, then, these miracles are preposterous.
Traditionally, alternative explanations are found, and the most hard-boiled miracles - the ones where it really becomes impossible to explain the narrative in terms of anything else - end up being discounted as myth. Why is that? Because such events lie outside our concept of how cause and effect work - we don't see how that can have been brought about. What has happened is that we have asserted, in effect, that all events must be confined to material cause and effect. Miracles don't happen, basically, because miracles don't happen.
Incidentally, a kind of reverse process happens for some aspects of myth. I remember in secondary school, some aspects of the account of Jason's travels in the Argo sound scientifically preposterous. But set against the background of the explosion of Santorini, all of a sudden some of the events become somewhat more explicable. That's another post, though ....
If you don't believe in God, or you believe in a God who is constrained to act in accordance with the laws of the universe, or you believe in a God who is detached from the universe, then it's inevitable that you will end up having to find an alternative explanation for miracles. But from a Christian point of view, there is no such problem. In Christian epistemological terms, the universe is God's universe. He created it; he has the ability to define the nature of reality. If he chooses to make the sun stand still over Gibeon - to suspend the laws of nature for some period of time, in one locality - then he can do that. The fact that there is no scientific way of explaining how it happened and no evidence for it is neither here nor there. That doesn't mean it didn't take place - simply that our scientific framework gives us no ability to determine how it took place.
Of course, this itself will rankle with people brought up on anything close to a materialistic worldview. "If we can't explain it, and there is no evidence for it, then how can we know it happened?" The thing is that materialism doesn't provide a worldview for explaining everything we see anyway. Aside from the fact that we can't really escape definitively from the solipsistic perspective that everything is in fact a dream, we then have to wrestle with the fact that materialism doesn't actually provide anything like a proper explanation of why there should be anything rather than nothing. In other words, rejecting accounts of miracles because they aren't consistent with a materialistic explanation of an event begs the issue that materialism fails to provide an adequate explanation of phenomena which are observed, and which we are unable to reject.
This is, I think, the heart of one of Berlinski's arguments against "atheism and its scientific pretentions" in "The Devil's Delusion".
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
The response to Berlinski, Witt and Wiker ...
... from the anti-ID community, is interesting.
Basically, there isn't one.
These are two of the most telling books written from a pro-ID perspective. "The Devil's Delusion" by David Berlinski - with the pointed reference to Dawkins in the title, and which dismantles the arguments of Pinker, Gould, Dawkins and many others - seems to have escaped the attention of Panda's Thumb, and a search on Google garners very little in the way of critical reviews. The same goes for "A Meaningful World" by Jonathan Witt and Benjamin Wiker - no comment from Panda's Thumb.
Why is that, then? Are these the books that opponents of ID would just rather pretend didn't exist? ITWSBT
Basically, there isn't one.
These are two of the most telling books written from a pro-ID perspective. "The Devil's Delusion" by David Berlinski - with the pointed reference to Dawkins in the title, and which dismantles the arguments of Pinker, Gould, Dawkins and many others - seems to have escaped the attention of Panda's Thumb, and a search on Google garners very little in the way of critical reviews. The same goes for "A Meaningful World" by Jonathan Witt and Benjamin Wiker - no comment from Panda's Thumb.
Why is that, then? Are these the books that opponents of ID would just rather pretend didn't exist? ITWSBT
Wednesday, November 07, 2007
Is Platonism a means, not an end?
In "A Meaningful World", Wiker and Witt write, on Euclid's demonstration of Pythagoras' theorem:
Like the circle, [the right triangle is] one of the sturdiest things in the cosmos and, at the same time, utterly immaterial. Physical circles are never really perfectly circular; physical right triangles always fall short of perfection. We grasp such geometrical figures only with our minds, never with our hands. When we do grasp the demonstration, even though we may do it through particular drawings, we lay hold of why it must be so in any particular case from the nature of the right triangle as such - but there is no "right triangle as such" out there floating in the cosmos that we can either see with our eyes or grasp with our hands. The struggle to understand the demonstration about right triangles is the struggle to grasp something that is immaterial.
But if we are successful in this struggle, and we glimpse the necessity of the geometric relationships as such, then and only then can we see why it must be so in every possible case and not just in this or that particular drawn triangle. Even more profound, if we reflect on our own reflection, we receive a more beautiful proof, a demonstration that we have, in our reason, a power to grasp immaterial truths - a power that somehow exceeds the particular, physically defined powers of our senses and imagination and is capable of grasping universal truth. Could this be a proof of the immateriality of the soul?
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
Thoughts from Darwin's Angel
"Darwin's Angel", by John Cornwell, is an enjoyable and thought-provoking read, and not just because it is another book that deconstructs large chunks of "The God Delusion". I have just finished it, and it has left me with plenty to think about.
The idea is that the guardian angel of Darwin (and Dawkins) addresses communication to Dawkins following his writing of TGD. Here's an extract from the chapter entitled, "Does God Exist?" which is very relevant to many of the debates that have taken place on this blog - and it addresses my thoughts as much as those of commenters.
The idea is that the guardian angel of Darwin (and Dawkins) addresses communication to Dawkins following his writing of TGD. Here's an extract from the chapter entitled, "Does God Exist?" which is very relevant to many of the debates that have taken place on this blog - and it addresses my thoughts as much as those of commenters.
The ultimate fallacy of your [ie. Dawkins'] position, and Russell's, is that you confuse two quite different areas of discourse, the scientific and the religious. You ask to see evidence, give me the evidence and I will believe, you say, no matter how surprised you would be. But the question 'Why is there anything rather than nothing?' is not a final bid for evidence but a quest for meaning or sense that has begun in a moment of wonder that there is anything at all. You ridicule the quest because you do not seem to understand it. If you understood it, you would not ridicule it even if you felt unable to go there yourself. That you do not understand it is shown by the fact that you actually think that "argument for God" is an argument for the ludicrous anthropomorphic deity that rightly appals you. If denying this claim, as you do, is what makes a person an atheist, then most Christian theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, Father McCabe, and yours truly, can also be characterised as atheists.
A real atheist, like yourself, is one who does not accept that the question 'Why is there anything rather than nothing?' is a genuine question. You are content to ask the question within the world, but you can't see that the existence of the world raises a profound question: again, as Martin Rees, following Wittgenstein, has put it: "The preeminent mystery is why anything exists at all. What breathes life into the equations of physics, and actualized them in a real cosmos? Such questions lie beyond science, however: they are the province of philosophers and theologians."
Philosophers through the ages have invoked the possibility of God as the answer to the existence, as opposed to the non-existence, of the universe: and creation is the name given to the notion of its coming into being. By the same analogy creation is also the word given to the exercise whereby a poem, a piece of music, a painting, a sculpture, is brought into existence by the artist.
Darwin's Angel, John Cornwell p.152-3
Tuesday, August 21, 2007
Del Ratzsch - an alternative to Dawkins
I've been reading "Nature, Design and Science", by Del Ratzsch. It's not an easy read. Ratzsch is a professor of philosophy, so this book is formal and careful, where "The God Delusion" is conversational but correspondingly casual. However, almost every paragraph has weight.
This understanding of the nature of the universe doesn't logically rule out agent intervention in the universe - it just suggests that there may be no direct evidence of agent intervention in observable and measurable phenomena.
The last sentence is a bit of a teaser. Schaeffer covers similar ground in an essay called "Is propositional revelation nonsense?" - and the Bible makes a similar point, of course. Why would such a designer make himself invisible? Perhaps the nature of the universe is such that people will naturally look for a designer - it looks artifactual - something acknowledged by Dawkins (the word he uses is "designoid"). And if we are looking for a designer, but the evidence from the universe is ambiguous (why should there be so much evil and suffering, for example?) then perhaps we need a clearer self-revelation. Okay then, so let's look for one ....
There is a widely held, vague supposition that the discovery that a phenomenon is purely natural removes any prospect of its being designed. That something is a product of unaided nature [Ratzsch terms this "pronautral"] does entail that its history does not involve any intervention into the historical course of the cosmos (i.e., that it is neither artifact nor natrifact [a term he uses for phenomena that are part of nature but which show signs of supernatural intervention]). But sinceboth the pronatural and the natrifactual can be intended results of agent activity deliberately aimed at producing the manifested patterns, the distinction between them is not one of presence or absence of designedness. Discovering a wholly natural process for producing some phenomenon in nature entails only that if it is designed, the relevant agent activity is primordial.So much, in such a short extract. A couple of quick thoughts - I still have much reading to go, and I don't know where he is taking all this yet. This relates more to a deistic designer, rather than a theistic one. However, he is making the philosophical point already that whether or not there is empirical evidence for a designer does not necessarily have a bearing on whether such a designer exists, or is necessary. This is an answer from a philosopher to those people who say, "Show me the evidence".
This distinction between design resulting from intervention and design produced by the unaided outworking of initiating structures has an extremely long history. Bacon, for instance:
God ... doth accomplish and fulfil his divine will [by ways] not immediate and direct, but by compass; not violating Nature, which is his own law upon the creation.
And in Whewell one finds explicit recognition of some of the implications - for example, that discovering purely natural processes for producing phenomena does not entail absence of design, but would involve a shift in the location of agent activity:
We have shown, we trust, that the notion of design and end is transferred by the researches of science, not from the domain of our knowledge to that of our ignorance, but merely from the region of facts to that of laws.
It is worth noting that both of the above quotes predate 1859. Contrary to common myth, this move was not simply and ad hoc attempt at salvaging some bit of design, while in forced retreat from Darwin.
In the absence of primary marks, there are relatively few means by which designedness could be identified. One of the possibilities is agent-initiated communication ....
Nature, Design and Science p.55
This understanding of the nature of the universe doesn't logically rule out agent intervention in the universe - it just suggests that there may be no direct evidence of agent intervention in observable and measurable phenomena.
The last sentence is a bit of a teaser. Schaeffer covers similar ground in an essay called "Is propositional revelation nonsense?" - and the Bible makes a similar point, of course. Why would such a designer make himself invisible? Perhaps the nature of the universe is such that people will naturally look for a designer - it looks artifactual - something acknowledged by Dawkins (the word he uses is "designoid"). And if we are looking for a designer, but the evidence from the universe is ambiguous (why should there be so much evil and suffering, for example?) then perhaps we need a clearer self-revelation. Okay then, so let's look for one ....
Monday, August 13, 2007
Plantinga on Dawkins
A more highly tuned philosophical mind than mine turns its attention to "The God Delusion" here.
Now despite the fact that this book is mainly philosophy, Dawkins is not a philosopher (he's a biologist). Even taking this into account, however, much of the philosophy he purveys is at best jejune. You might say that some of his forays into philosophy are at best sophomoric, but that would be unfair to sophomores; the fact is (grade inflation aside), many of his arguments would receive a failing grade in a sophomore philosophy class.
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Theology of evolution/creationism/ID
(H/T Telic Thoughts, as usual)
A post here about some of the theological implications of evolution/ID/creationism. I guess I would agree with the theology of the original article. It is worth pointing out, however, that just because the media version of the creationist/ID God is limited by assumptions of deism doesn't mean that mine ever was. I have been pointing out for some time, for example, that the designer doesn't logically require a designer, so the "who designed the designer?" question need not be well-founded.
Good points, well made. However, since theology is "study without an object" and "the emperor has no clothes", I have little doubt that the article and review will stir no interest amongst the new atheists, those people who might have most to gain from reading it.
A post here about some of the theological implications of evolution/ID/creationism. I guess I would agree with the theology of the original article. It is worth pointing out, however, that just because the media version of the creationist/ID God is limited by assumptions of deism doesn't mean that mine ever was. I have been pointing out for some time, for example, that the designer doesn't logically require a designer, so the "who designed the designer?" question need not be well-founded.
Good points, well made. However, since theology is "study without an object" and "the emperor has no clothes", I have little doubt that the article and review will stir no interest amongst the new atheists, those people who might have most to gain from reading it.
Monday, July 16, 2007
Darwin or Design?
(H/T Telic Thoughts)
People interested in the issues surrounding Intelligent Design may be interested in an audio-book that has been put together by Jason Rennie, called "Darwin or Design?" It consists of a series of 25 interviews with a range of people who are connected with the arguments - both pro and anti-ID. The first interview is with the scary P.Z.Myers - who in real life is not quite as scary as his Pharyngula persona might suggest. Nick Matzke, who according to William Dembski has put together the most coherent explanation for how an apparently irreducibly complex system might evolve, is also interviewed. There are interviews with Michael Behe ("The Edge of Evolution"), Guillermo Gonzalez ("The Privileged Planet"), Mike Gene ("The Design Matrix"), Del Ratzsch, Elliot Sober, Denyse O'Leary and others.
A couple of thoughts on this. The internet offers the opportunity for far wider discussion and interchange than was offered by traditional media and publishing, and also a much more direct access between writers and their readers. This is an excellent example of this. The Darwin or Design website includes a discussion forum - the making available of the book is only a first step.
And on issues like this, in particular, if the argument could move away from two sides being suspicious of each other and bashing one another, and towards a real dialogue, we could perhaps see a return to the sort of engagement with ideas that was typical of the golden age in Athens, for example.
People interested in the issues surrounding Intelligent Design may be interested in an audio-book that has been put together by Jason Rennie, called "Darwin or Design?" It consists of a series of 25 interviews with a range of people who are connected with the arguments - both pro and anti-ID. The first interview is with the scary P.Z.Myers - who in real life is not quite as scary as his Pharyngula persona might suggest. Nick Matzke, who according to William Dembski has put together the most coherent explanation for how an apparently irreducibly complex system might evolve, is also interviewed. There are interviews with Michael Behe ("The Edge of Evolution"), Guillermo Gonzalez ("The Privileged Planet"), Mike Gene ("The Design Matrix"), Del Ratzsch, Elliot Sober, Denyse O'Leary and others.
A couple of thoughts on this. The internet offers the opportunity for far wider discussion and interchange than was offered by traditional media and publishing, and also a much more direct access between writers and their readers. This is an excellent example of this. The Darwin or Design website includes a discussion forum - the making available of the book is only a first step.
And on issues like this, in particular, if the argument could move away from two sides being suspicious of each other and bashing one another, and towards a real dialogue, we could perhaps see a return to the sort of engagement with ideas that was typical of the golden age in Athens, for example.
Sunday, July 15, 2007
Interesting propositions
A society without insulting and boorish behaviour is one without freedom. A society without freedom is not civilised.Discuss.
I have reservations about the second statement and disagree with the first, but I think they are interesting points for debate.
Regarding the second statement. The problem here, as I see it, is one of definitions. "Society" I can run with, at least for now. But what is "freedom"? What is "civilised"? I would suggest that such terms are socially conditioned, not universal - and I would suggest that this can be demonstrated historically.
To consider the sentence in today's cultural terms, people's normal understanding of "freedom" normally means "individual freedom" - the freedom for me to do as I wish, at least as long as it doesn't harm anybody else. Trivially, if somebody considers "individual freedom" the highest good for a society, then the sentence is tautological - and with respect to the commenter, I suspect he/she may be in this category of people. As for me, I do regard individual freedom as a desirable characteristic for a society - but this is coupled with the fact that I believe people should largely be prepared to use their individual freedom for the sake of others.
The next issue is, given the first sentence, whether being "insulting and boorish" is actually harming anybody. I would suggest that it is causing harm - it is psychologically intimidating, and provoking others to dislike. Should freedom include the freedom to be insulting and boorish? Actually, I would say yes - because my idea of freedom (perhaps like my commenter) acknowledges the fact that it includes the potential for harming other people.
This is actually kind of obvious. If I am permitted to drive a car at normal speeds, then I actually have the freedom (technically) to run somebody over and kill them. This is a "freedom to harm somebody" that we all take for granted. Of course, it would be socially unacceptable (and in fact, a criminal act) - but our society grants us the freedom to do it - it doesn't constrain us in such a way that we are unable to do it.
Does that mean that being insulting and boorish is characteristic of a free society? Well, hopefully not. Not in the "conventional" free society in today's terms - because being insulting and boorish is harming others. And not in my "free" society either - because the freedom of the individual is used primarily to serve other members of the society, rather than get what the individual wants. (I trust that theologically aware readers may recognise the sort of behaviour that is required of Christians in this model of a free society.)
So how would I rewrite this first sentence? I would have said, "A society in which insulting and boorish behaviour is forbidden is one without freedom." However, I don't think that such behaviour is a sign of a healthy society - and were my commenter not being an apologist for Richard Dawkins, I think he would concede this as well.
There are many people who don't have much time for the idea that an omnipotent god could allow evil. However, this discussion relates closely to how Christians traditionally justify the presence of evil behaviour. Should people be created genuinely free, and consequently able to do things that are wrong? Or should their freedom be circumscribed, to prevent this? Many people might suggest that the fact that people are capable of doing things that are considered evil means that there can't be an omnipotent god.
Oddly, the data can be interpreted in exactly the opposite way. If a god creates us genuinely free, then we have to be free to do evil, not just good. Conversely, I would argue that the whole concepts of "right" and "wrong" become fundamentally meaningless without the concept of an external absolute. Of course, people don't behave that way, and will argue that morality is an evolutionarily advantageous trait. I certainly don't disagree that both the theist and the atheist are moral beings. I'm just not convinced that (as with many aspects of how atheism works) the case for morality as it is found in humans is coherent within an atheist framework.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
Belief in God
bethinking.org, the UCCF apologetics website, has a good, meaty article by William Lane Craig here on religious epistemology. It covers lots of ground, including many of the issues raised by commenters here. If you'd rather listen than read, it's available to download as an MP3 file, apparently.
On the challenge represented by logical positivism to religious belief (which still represents the heart of the objection of many people from a science background to non-materialistic philosophy), he says:
On whether a presumption of atheism is reasonable, in the absence of immediate evidence to the contrary, William Lane Craig writes:
On the challenge represented by logical positivism to religious belief (which still represents the heart of the objection of many people from a science background to non-materialistic philosophy), he says:
In general, verificationist analyses of meaning ran into two insuperable problems: (1) The verification/falsification principle was too restrictive. It was quickly realized that on such theories of meaning vast tracts of obviously meaningful discourse would have to be declared meaningless, including even scientific statements, which the principle had aimed to preserve. (2) The principle was self-refuting. The statement “In order to be meaningful, an informative sentence must be capable in principle of being empirically verified/falsified" is itself incapable of being verified or falsified. Therefore, it is by its own lights a meaningless statement–or, at best, an arbitrary definition which we are free to reject. The inadequacies of the positivistic theory of meaning led to the complete collapse of Logical Positivism during the second half of the twentieth century...Unfortunately, the word didn't really get out.
On whether a presumption of atheism is reasonable, in the absence of immediate evidence to the contrary, William Lane Craig writes:
Michael Scriven, for example, maintained that in the absence of evidence rendering the existence of some entity probable, we are justified in believing that it does not exist, provided that (1) it is not something which might leave no traces, and (2) we have comprehensively surveyed the area where the evidence would be found if the entity existed. But if this is correct, then our justification for atheism depends on (1) the probability that God would leave more evidence of His existence than what we have and (2) the probability that we have comprehensively surveyed the field for evidence of His existence That puts a different face on the matter! Suddenly the presumer of atheism, who sought to shirk his share of the burden of proof, finds himself saddled with the very considerable burden of proving (1) and (2) to be the case.The author also explains why Pascal's Wager is not a good argument for Christianity, before explaining Plantinga's reformed epistemology, and extending it.
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
Is that it?
Dawkins says yes. Hofstadter says no. The Scientific American review sides with Hofstadter, apparently. I know whose writing captivates me more - "Eternal Golden Braid" is one of the books that changed my life.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
More US protectionism
Let's set aside the issue of the scientific evidence for now.
We can't show evidence for ID or creationism in school because it makes reference to a designer, which might be God, and this violates the first amendment.
And we can't show any evidence that might cast doubt on darwinism either, because students might then want to know if there is an alternative, and we would look really stupid saying, "I can't tell you about this, because it would be against the constitution."
Which means that darwinism has to be the only worldview taught as science in schools.
Which means that people who have done high school science will probably think that any alternative is fundamentally not science, and this inference isn't based on a consideration of scientific evidence, but simply on the basis of the constitution.
Now is science supposed to work by studying the evidence? Or by constitutional fiat?
Let's try again, and again set aside the issue of evidence.
We won't teach creationism or ID in science at university because it contradicts philosophical naturalism - the principle that science is only about natural causes. We won't draw attention to the fact that philosophical naturalism isn't the only way of doing science, and is actually a reflection of a particular philosophical worldview - that is, it is a religious or philosophical belief. We won't mention that most of modern science was founded by people who accepted that the scientific method inferred methodological naturalism but not philosophical naturalism.
Which means that students won't be looking at ID or creationism regardless of the nature of the evidence for design.
Which means that the rising generation of scientists will have not investigated the arguments for themselves, and will simply accept the assertion of the older generation that ID and creationism aren't scientific. This isn't on the basis of analysis of the evidence that they present, but because they have been told this is the case - how many undergraduate students really understand anything of the philosophy of science?
Is this how science is supposed to work?
People accuse the ID community of playing politics. There are almost certainly groups within the US that are doing that. But at least part of the reason for this is because the debate has been closed down politically, and not in terms of science. No substantive scientific case is being made against ID and creationism. Instead, their opponents are more concerned to prevent discussion occurring - and will make reference to the constitution, federal judges and philosophy to prevent discussion of the evidence happening.
We can't show evidence for ID or creationism in school because it makes reference to a designer, which might be God, and this violates the first amendment.
And we can't show any evidence that might cast doubt on darwinism either, because students might then want to know if there is an alternative, and we would look really stupid saying, "I can't tell you about this, because it would be against the constitution."
Which means that darwinism has to be the only worldview taught as science in schools.
Which means that people who have done high school science will probably think that any alternative is fundamentally not science, and this inference isn't based on a consideration of scientific evidence, but simply on the basis of the constitution.
Now is science supposed to work by studying the evidence? Or by constitutional fiat?
Let's try again, and again set aside the issue of evidence.
We won't teach creationism or ID in science at university because it contradicts philosophical naturalism - the principle that science is only about natural causes. We won't draw attention to the fact that philosophical naturalism isn't the only way of doing science, and is actually a reflection of a particular philosophical worldview - that is, it is a religious or philosophical belief. We won't mention that most of modern science was founded by people who accepted that the scientific method inferred methodological naturalism but not philosophical naturalism.
Which means that students won't be looking at ID or creationism regardless of the nature of the evidence for design.
Which means that the rising generation of scientists will have not investigated the arguments for themselves, and will simply accept the assertion of the older generation that ID and creationism aren't scientific. This isn't on the basis of analysis of the evidence that they present, but because they have been told this is the case - how many undergraduate students really understand anything of the philosophy of science?
Is this how science is supposed to work?
People accuse the ID community of playing politics. There are almost certainly groups within the US that are doing that. But at least part of the reason for this is because the debate has been closed down politically, and not in terms of science. No substantive scientific case is being made against ID and creationism. Instead, their opponents are more concerned to prevent discussion occurring - and will make reference to the constitution, federal judges and philosophy to prevent discussion of the evidence happening.
Monday, February 05, 2007
"If Minds had Toes", Lucy Eyre
My wife bought this for me on a whim for my birthday, and I am so pleased! As far as I know, "Sophie's World", by Jostein Gaarder, was the first book that explicitly directed philosophical questions at people from smart teenagers upwards. This is the second.
A teenager Ben finds himself the subject of a bet between Socrates and Ludwig Wittgenstein, from "The World of Ideas" - a place where some people go after death, supposedly. A variety of philosophical questions (Is death the worst thing that can happen to you? What is happiness? Do we have free will?) are introduced to him, with characters around him arguing for different philosophical positions. As tends to be the way, no conclusions are really reached - but by the end of the book, Ben has (and hopefully the reader will have) a more thoughtful perspective on the nature of life, the universe and everything - and he has a "better life" as a consequence of what he has learnt and discussed.
The principal characters are sympathetic and well-painted. The plot is imaginative and playful. The writing is snappy and clever:
A teenager Ben finds himself the subject of a bet between Socrates and Ludwig Wittgenstein, from "The World of Ideas" - a place where some people go after death, supposedly. A variety of philosophical questions (Is death the worst thing that can happen to you? What is happiness? Do we have free will?) are introduced to him, with characters around him arguing for different philosophical positions. As tends to be the way, no conclusions are really reached - but by the end of the book, Ben has (and hopefully the reader will have) a more thoughtful perspective on the nature of life, the universe and everything - and he has a "better life" as a consequence of what he has learnt and discussed.
The principal characters are sympathetic and well-painted. The plot is imaginative and playful. The writing is snappy and clever:
Ben had heard of Plato. And now he'd seen his sports car, he was even more impressed.And if we are really homo sapiens, then we ought to be thinking about the issues that the author discusses.
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
"The God Delusion"
... is substantively reviewed by H.Allen Orr in "The New York Review of Books". This is an incredibly quotable article - it's really better to read the whole thing than simply try and find a choice selection.
As T.S. Eliot famously observed, to ask whether we would have been better off without religion is to ask a question whose answer is unknowable. Our entire history has been so thoroughly shaped by Judeo-Christian tradition that we cannot imagine the present state of society in its absence. But there's a deeper point and one that Dawkins also fails to see. Even what we mean by the world being better off is conditioned by our religious inheritance. What most of us in the West mean—and what Dawkins, as revealed by his own Ten Commandments, means—is a world in which individuals are free to express their thoughts and passions and to develop their talents so long as these do not infringe on the ability of others to do so. But this is assuredly not what a better world would look like to, say, a traditional Confucian culture. There, a new and improved world might be one that allows the readier suppression of in-dividual differences and aspirations. The point is that all judgments, including ethical ones, begin somewhere and ours, often enough, begin in Judaism and Christianity. Dawkins should, of course, be applauded for his attempt to picture a better world. But intellectual honesty demands acknowledging that his moral vision derives, to a considerable extent, from the tradition he so despises.[
Thursday, December 28, 2006
Sovereignty and free will
Dunno if I've blogged this before, but it bears repeating.
How can God be sovereign, but humans still have free will?
Look at it this way. Conceptually, I could write a computer program that carries out an action on the basis of a random number. Then I could set the seed of the random number generator. Which means I can know (as the author of the program) exactly what random number will appear, and hence how that program is going to behave. But from the perspective of the program, it was coded to cover any random value that appears at that point. There is a difference between my knowledge (as programmer) and the program's "knowledge". The program is written in such a way that it is able to deal with any value that pops up, even though I know as the programmer what value it will get and hence how it behaves.
Now I believe that God is sovereign. From his perspective, he knows what I am going to do - indeed, he has ordained it. But as a human, I have absolutely no knowledge of what he has ordained - and I am acting as far as I can tell perfectly freely. Furthermore, I have the potential as a human being to act perfectly freely - I am not a robot constrained to behave in a particular way.
People argue that if I believe God is sovereign, then I weaken human freedom. But since my knowledge of the fact that God is sovereign tells me nothing about what God's plan is, nor does it constrain my behaviour in any way, I don't see that it is wrong to describe me as being free, and also responsible.
I can think of all sorts of illustrations that would relate to this. The disciples all knew that somebody was going to betray Jesus - but Judas still did it. The Bible said that the Servant would be cut off from the land of the living - and it still happened.
On a more domestic scale, I might forbid a small child to do something - in the fairly sure knowledge that they will not listen to my prohibition. I "sovereignly" know that the child will disobey my prohibition - but that makes the child no less responsible when he or she does what I have asked him or her not to do.
Update: I thought I'd posted something like this before. See here - a more substantial post.
How can God be sovereign, but humans still have free will?
Look at it this way. Conceptually, I could write a computer program that carries out an action on the basis of a random number. Then I could set the seed of the random number generator. Which means I can know (as the author of the program) exactly what random number will appear, and hence how that program is going to behave. But from the perspective of the program, it was coded to cover any random value that appears at that point. There is a difference between my knowledge (as programmer) and the program's "knowledge". The program is written in such a way that it is able to deal with any value that pops up, even though I know as the programmer what value it will get and hence how it behaves.
Now I believe that God is sovereign. From his perspective, he knows what I am going to do - indeed, he has ordained it. But as a human, I have absolutely no knowledge of what he has ordained - and I am acting as far as I can tell perfectly freely. Furthermore, I have the potential as a human being to act perfectly freely - I am not a robot constrained to behave in a particular way.
People argue that if I believe God is sovereign, then I weaken human freedom. But since my knowledge of the fact that God is sovereign tells me nothing about what God's plan is, nor does it constrain my behaviour in any way, I don't see that it is wrong to describe me as being free, and also responsible.
I can think of all sorts of illustrations that would relate to this. The disciples all knew that somebody was going to betray Jesus - but Judas still did it. The Bible said that the Servant would be cut off from the land of the living - and it still happened.
On a more domestic scale, I might forbid a small child to do something - in the fairly sure knowledge that they will not listen to my prohibition. I "sovereignly" know that the child will disobey my prohibition - but that makes the child no less responsible when he or she does what I have asked him or her not to do.
Update: I thought I'd posted something like this before. See here - a more substantial post.
Tuesday, December 26, 2006
Epistemology - the alternative
Part 1, Part 2
Now, what becomes obvious, despite the current popularity of street-level postmodernism, is that we do have a sense that there is such a thing as objective truth. Postmodern writers, despite what they say, write assuming that they are able to convey something real about the nature of the universe – even when what they write is supposedly denying this. And the assumption of empiricism is that there is such a thing as objective truth, even if modernism doesn't provide us with an adequate means of knowing what the objective truth is.
So what we really need is another epistemological foundation – one that doesn't throw away the idea of objective truth (like postmodernism), but one that doesn't ground the idea of objective truth in the first instance in the observer (like modernism), which we have seen is also a dead end in epistemological terms.
The universe didn't start with the arrival of Descartes, and as I hinted before, the epistemological basis of the first scientists wasn't that of the modernists. Modern science actually arose, by and large, in post-Reformation Europe. The Reformation took place at around the same time as the Renaissance, but whereas the Renaissance was a humanist movement that looked back to the classical era, the Reformation was fundamentally a Christian movement, that was shaped by people with a high regard for the Bible. The epistemology of the Reformation was widely shared in post-Reformation Europe, even though the man in the street would perhaps have been no more able to explain it than the man on the Clapham Omnibus can today explain postmodernism, despite the fact that he has an aversion to the idea of absolute truth.
So what was this epistemology? It was based on the Bible, and it is founded upon the idea of a God who had created the universe. There is a gap between this creator God and humanity, caused by the rejection of the authority of God by humanity. This means that the creator God is now hidden from humanity, and the universe is “messed up”. But God wanted to act to restore the proper relationship between himself and humans, and has acted to do so.
God has made himself known to humans, firstly in general revelation (the idea that when we look at the universe, or ourselves, there are signs that there is a god), and secondly in special revelation (the Bible gives us a much more full account of what God is like, in particular in the person of Jesus, and these are consistent with what we see in the world).
The picture we are given about God in the Bible is that (from the point of view of a working epistemology) he is eternally consistent and he is the creator of the universe. Humans were created within the universe to know God, and he is seeking to make himself known to us.
So what, in short terms, is the nature of this epistemological foundation? It is that we can know truth because there is an external absolute who created us to know it. We are unable to know more than subjectively, but we can be confident that there is a correspondence between our subjective knowledge and objective truth about the universe because there is an objective knower who is making it known to us.
What are some of the effects of this?Our instinct that there is such a thing as objective truth would be well-founded – it isn't simply a by-product of a chemical reaction. Nor is it simply a “good working hypothesis”, with no necessary basis in anything that is real. No human viewpoint is artificially “privileged” - everybody has access to both “general revelation” through which God makes himself known and now also “special revelation” in which God gives more detail about what he has done to deal with the gap between himself and humanity. The gathering of knowledge about the universe (“science”) is a reasonable pursuit – if God is eternal and consistent, we can work on the basis that all else being equal, the universe will behave in a consistent and predictable way. So naturalism is a sensible methodological approach within this epistemological framework. Further, perhaps one could argue that the more knowledge that we gather about the universe, the more clearly the God who created it will be revealed. On the other hand, since God as creator is free (in the same way that he was free to create, or not create) we have to allow the possibility that not everything about his actions will be comprehensible. His consistency doesn't mean that he is bound by the laws of the universe (which after all, he would have made!), but it does mean that he is bound by the laws of his own nature. What are the limits of this? Perhaps one could argue that naturalistic consistency would apply unless this would override God's purposes to make himself known – his self-revelation. Due to the difference in nature of the creator and the created, we wouldn't expect to know exhaustively about what God is like – but that doesn't prevent us from truly knowing about God.
It can hardly come as a surprise to regular readers of this blog that this is very much my epistemological foundation. I see big flaws in the alternatives, all of which are dealt with in this reformed epistemology.
In future posts, I'd like to try and show how different epistemological worldviews shape other aspects of people's philosophy.
Now, what becomes obvious, despite the current popularity of street-level postmodernism, is that we do have a sense that there is such a thing as objective truth. Postmodern writers, despite what they say, write assuming that they are able to convey something real about the nature of the universe – even when what they write is supposedly denying this. And the assumption of empiricism is that there is such a thing as objective truth, even if modernism doesn't provide us with an adequate means of knowing what the objective truth is.
So what we really need is another epistemological foundation – one that doesn't throw away the idea of objective truth (like postmodernism), but one that doesn't ground the idea of objective truth in the first instance in the observer (like modernism), which we have seen is also a dead end in epistemological terms.
The universe didn't start with the arrival of Descartes, and as I hinted before, the epistemological basis of the first scientists wasn't that of the modernists. Modern science actually arose, by and large, in post-Reformation Europe. The Reformation took place at around the same time as the Renaissance, but whereas the Renaissance was a humanist movement that looked back to the classical era, the Reformation was fundamentally a Christian movement, that was shaped by people with a high regard for the Bible. The epistemology of the Reformation was widely shared in post-Reformation Europe, even though the man in the street would perhaps have been no more able to explain it than the man on the Clapham Omnibus can today explain postmodernism, despite the fact that he has an aversion to the idea of absolute truth.
So what was this epistemology? It was based on the Bible, and it is founded upon the idea of a God who had created the universe. There is a gap between this creator God and humanity, caused by the rejection of the authority of God by humanity. This means that the creator God is now hidden from humanity, and the universe is “messed up”. But God wanted to act to restore the proper relationship between himself and humans, and has acted to do so.
God has made himself known to humans, firstly in general revelation (the idea that when we look at the universe, or ourselves, there are signs that there is a god), and secondly in special revelation (the Bible gives us a much more full account of what God is like, in particular in the person of Jesus, and these are consistent with what we see in the world).
The picture we are given about God in the Bible is that (from the point of view of a working epistemology) he is eternally consistent and he is the creator of the universe. Humans were created within the universe to know God, and he is seeking to make himself known to us.
So what, in short terms, is the nature of this epistemological foundation? It is that we can know truth because there is an external absolute who created us to know it. We are unable to know more than subjectively, but we can be confident that there is a correspondence between our subjective knowledge and objective truth about the universe because there is an objective knower who is making it known to us.
What are some of the effects of this?
It can hardly come as a surprise to regular readers of this blog that this is very much my epistemological foundation. I see big flaws in the alternatives, all of which are dealt with in this reformed epistemology.
In future posts, I'd like to try and show how different epistemological worldviews shape other aspects of people's philosophy.
Epistemology - postmodernism
Part 1
Another possible foundation has been proposed. This foundation is that there is no such thing as objective truth – that all that is possible is to know that something is subjectively true “for me”. This is the postmodern epistemological foundation.
The problem with this foundation is that it doesn't even hold itself up. We can't come to the conclusion that all truth is subjective if we have no way of being able to establish that something is objectively true – the statement that all truth is subjective is itself a statement that makes objective claims about the nature of truth. This can be written right across the entire output of postmodern philosophy. We are told by postmodern writers (for example, Derrida) that the interpretation of a text depends not upon the author's intent, but upon the reader. This is founded upon the postmodern epistemology, that truth is subjective. But if the same process is applied to the text of the postmodern writer, then it is obvious that his or her writing has no objective force at all.
For people who haven't come across “high postmodernism”, this form of explicit statement about the nature of truth may be something of a surprise. However, you don't have to look very far into our culture to see things like “feminist interpretations of Shakespeare” (with the implicit assumption that Shakespeare's interpretation of Shakespeare doesn't exist, and that this interpretation is at least as good as any other). Also, we now have a culturally instinctive opposition to any statement that sounds like a declaration of absolute truth. For example, I remember a conversation I had once. The person I was talking to said something along the lines of: “I don't smoke, but I think people have the right to do what they choose.” I said: “I think smoking is a stupid, dangerous habit, and the only reason it is allowed to continue is because the government makes so much money from it.” “Well, we're all entitled to our opinions,” was the prickly response – in the sense, presumably, that whilst I might consider smoking to be stupid and dangerous, people were quite at liberty to believe something else if they chose to – whether smoking was stupid and dangerous was a matter of subjective truth. So at the level of normal people, the postmodern idea that truth is entirely subjective is increasingly taking hold.
Another possible foundation has been proposed. This foundation is that there is no such thing as objective truth – that all that is possible is to know that something is subjectively true “for me”. This is the postmodern epistemological foundation.
The problem with this foundation is that it doesn't even hold itself up. We can't come to the conclusion that all truth is subjective if we have no way of being able to establish that something is objectively true – the statement that all truth is subjective is itself a statement that makes objective claims about the nature of truth. This can be written right across the entire output of postmodern philosophy. We are told by postmodern writers (for example, Derrida) that the interpretation of a text depends not upon the author's intent, but upon the reader. This is founded upon the postmodern epistemology, that truth is subjective. But if the same process is applied to the text of the postmodern writer, then it is obvious that his or her writing has no objective force at all.
For people who haven't come across “high postmodernism”, this form of explicit statement about the nature of truth may be something of a surprise. However, you don't have to look very far into our culture to see things like “feminist interpretations of Shakespeare” (with the implicit assumption that Shakespeare's interpretation of Shakespeare doesn't exist, and that this interpretation is at least as good as any other). Also, we now have a culturally instinctive opposition to any statement that sounds like a declaration of absolute truth. For example, I remember a conversation I had once. The person I was talking to said something along the lines of: “I don't smoke, but I think people have the right to do what they choose.” I said: “I think smoking is a stupid, dangerous habit, and the only reason it is allowed to continue is because the government makes so much money from it.” “Well, we're all entitled to our opinions,” was the prickly response – in the sense, presumably, that whilst I might consider smoking to be stupid and dangerous, people were quite at liberty to believe something else if they chose to – whether smoking was stupid and dangerous was a matter of subjective truth. So at the level of normal people, the postmodern idea that truth is entirely subjective is increasingly taking hold.
Epistemology - modernism
Epistemology is a part of philosophy that is to do with how we can know. It represents a foundation for our knowledge. We need to know how we can know before we can draw meaningful conclusions about what we know. Questions of epistemology are deeply fundamental – even more fundamental than questions like whether or not there is a god. The nature of our epistemology will have an impact on the conclusions that we draw about the nature of the universe. But epistemological questions are so fundamental – so low-level – that for the most part, they remain below the level of our consciousness. In this series of posts, I want to talk about what I understand of epistemological questions, where I am coming from, and how I justify my beliefs.
A possible epistemological foundation is the idea that an observer is able to objectively apprehend the nature of the universe around him or her. We can know things because when we look at the universe around us, we see it universe as it truly is. This is the foundation of modernism and naturalism – it continues to underlie the work of most scientists. Its philosophical roots were in the Renaissance – in, for example, Leonardo da Vinci looking as an observer for universals (incidentally, he failed – he was left only with mechanics) – and it reached its height in the Enlightenment.
But there are various problems with it. One is that it is not possible to determine whether an observer's view of the universe is objective. I don't know whether what I perceive of the universe is really how the universe is like. Hence the reference to Descartes in earlier posts - “I think therefore I am” allows me to conclude that I am truly conscious. However, it doesn't allow me to be confident of anything “outside” me – it gives me no confidence that what I perceive has any objective reality. In philosophical terms this foundation was beginning to look shaky before Darwin appeared. Various things have acted to discredit it. For example, Gödel's incompleteness theorem showed that there were propositions within mathematics that could not be proved – and that maths isn't an “absolute”, or an “objective truth”. The neodarwinian synthesis – a concept built up from this foundation – suggests that our consciousness is no more than a side effect of chemical processes. As such, we have no reason to believe that there should be any correlation with what our consciousness perceives and the nature of the universe. The fact that data can be interpreted in different ways also takes away confidence in this understanding of the universe.
It would be wrong to suggest that this foundation was useless. It wasn't the foundation of knowledge that modern science was originally built on (I'll come to that), but “modernist” scientists continue to dominate science – and they have achieved a great deal in helping us to understand the universe, even though their epistemological foundations don't allow them confidence that the universe exists!
One might argue: “Well, if this foundation is so helpful in allowing us to understand and explain the universe, then why not just run with it?” I would suggest that it's all about the difference between a mathematical observation (say that the sum of the squares on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides) and a mathematical proof of that observation. We may observe that we seem to be able to objectively apprehend the rest of the universe – but if we are unable to prove why that is the case, then have we missed the point somewhere? Many people simply work on the basis that this sort of knowledge is impossible, but they assume that their analysis of the universe is correct – I think this is what “empiricism” is. But without knowing that we have a sound epistemology, we are left wondering: will the universe continue to behave in this way? Do I have any way of knowing whether my observations of the universe will still be correct tomorrow? Do I have any way of knowing that my observations of the universe are shared by anybody else? Do I have any way of refuting an observation that somebody else claims to have made about the universe?
A possible epistemological foundation is the idea that an observer is able to objectively apprehend the nature of the universe around him or her. We can know things because when we look at the universe around us, we see it universe as it truly is. This is the foundation of modernism and naturalism – it continues to underlie the work of most scientists. Its philosophical roots were in the Renaissance – in, for example, Leonardo da Vinci looking as an observer for universals (incidentally, he failed – he was left only with mechanics) – and it reached its height in the Enlightenment.
But there are various problems with it. One is that it is not possible to determine whether an observer's view of the universe is objective. I don't know whether what I perceive of the universe is really how the universe is like. Hence the reference to Descartes in earlier posts - “I think therefore I am” allows me to conclude that I am truly conscious. However, it doesn't allow me to be confident of anything “outside” me – it gives me no confidence that what I perceive has any objective reality. In philosophical terms this foundation was beginning to look shaky before Darwin appeared. Various things have acted to discredit it. For example, Gödel's incompleteness theorem showed that there were propositions within mathematics that could not be proved – and that maths isn't an “absolute”, or an “objective truth”. The neodarwinian synthesis – a concept built up from this foundation – suggests that our consciousness is no more than a side effect of chemical processes. As such, we have no reason to believe that there should be any correlation with what our consciousness perceives and the nature of the universe. The fact that data can be interpreted in different ways also takes away confidence in this understanding of the universe.
It would be wrong to suggest that this foundation was useless. It wasn't the foundation of knowledge that modern science was originally built on (I'll come to that), but “modernist” scientists continue to dominate science – and they have achieved a great deal in helping us to understand the universe, even though their epistemological foundations don't allow them confidence that the universe exists!
One might argue: “Well, if this foundation is so helpful in allowing us to understand and explain the universe, then why not just run with it?” I would suggest that it's all about the difference between a mathematical observation (say that the sum of the squares on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides) and a mathematical proof of that observation. We may observe that we seem to be able to objectively apprehend the rest of the universe – but if we are unable to prove why that is the case, then have we missed the point somewhere? Many people simply work on the basis that this sort of knowledge is impossible, but they assume that their analysis of the universe is correct – I think this is what “empiricism” is. But without knowing that we have a sound epistemology, we are left wondering: will the universe continue to behave in this way? Do I have any way of knowing whether my observations of the universe will still be correct tomorrow? Do I have any way of knowing that my observations of the universe are shared by anybody else? Do I have any way of refuting an observation that somebody else claims to have made about the universe?
Tuesday, December 19, 2006
Logic, atheism and agnosticism
It is much politer to be "agnostic" than to be "atheist" - it comes across as much more tolerant - dare one say more enlightened?
However, let's apply a little logic. If you are agnostic, then what you are saying in effect is as follows. There may be a god, or there may not. But if there is a god, then the evidence for his/her/its existence is so slight that you can't definitely conclude that the god is there. God has no effect on the universe.
What is the functional difference between this position and saying "there is no God"?
However, let's apply a little logic. If you are agnostic, then what you are saying in effect is as follows. There may be a god, or there may not. But if there is a god, then the evidence for his/her/its existence is so slight that you can't definitely conclude that the god is there. God has no effect on the universe.
What is the functional difference between this position and saying "there is no God"?
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